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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Larry Marvin Severson appeals from the

district court’s

leave to ﬁle a third successive petition for post-conviction

order denying his motion for

The

relief.

state asserts that this

appeal should be dismissed because the district court lacked jurisdiction t0 address postconviction motions ﬁled in the underlying criminal case, years after a remittitur issued.
Alternatively, the district court’s order should be afﬁrmed, because denying leave

was

correct

0n

the merits.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

In 2002, Severson

was

Proceedings

indicted “0n one count of ﬁrst degree murder” for killing his Wife

“and one count 0f poisoning” her “food and/or medicine.”
701, 215 P.3d 414, 421 (2009) (hereinafter “Severson

both counts, the

district court

murder count and “ﬁve years

“sentenced him t0

life

I”).

State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,

After a jury found Severson guilty of

Without the possibility of parole” for the

for poisoning food and/or medicine.”

Court afﬁrmed the judgment of conviction and sentence in Severson

September

4,

2009. Li.

at

I

Li.

The Idaho Supreme

and a remittitur issued on

723; Remittitur, No. 32128; (R., p.135).

In October 0f 2009, Severson ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief,

subsequently reﬁled “with counsel’s assistance” in 201
district court

1.

(R.,

p.135 (footnote omitted).)

summarily dismissed the majority of the claims, and

dismissed the petition’s remaining claim that
refusing t0 permit [Severson] t0 testify in his

reversed and remanded.

Severson

V. State,

“trial

own

which was

after

The

an evidentiary hearing,

counsel provided ineffective assistance by

defense.”

N0. 40769, 2014

(Id.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals

WL 5068656 (Idaho Ct. App., Oct.

2014).

On

review 0f the court of appeals’ decision, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the

district court

0n

“did not err in summarily dismissing” claims of error “based on statements litigated

direct appeal.”

“Severson

Severson

V. State,

159 Idaho 517, 522, 363 P.3d 358, 363 (2015) (hereinafter

However, the Court also concluded

II”).

that “the district court erred in ruling that

issue preclusion barred Severson’s ineffective assistance claim based

The Idaho Supreme Court

direct appeal.” Li. (emphasis added).

court’s

summary

on statements not raised on

therefore “Vacate[d] the district

dismissal 0f Severson’s claims for ineffective assistance 0f counsel relating to

the allegedly improper statements that

were not raised on

and remanded. Li

direct appeal,”

at

523, 363 P.2d at 364.

On
third

remand, “[t]he

amended

district court

held an evidentiary hearing” and “dismissed Severson’s

Severson

petition” for post—conviction relief.

1787315 (Idaho

Ct. App., April 24,

V.

State,

No. 45780, 2019

2019) (unpublished, hereinafter “Severson

III”).

appealed and the Idaho Court 0f Appeals afﬁrmed in an unpublished 2019 opinion.

While Severson was
successive petitions.

litigating his petition for post-conviction relief

Severson ﬁled his ﬁrst successive petition 0n

May 9,

Li

WL

Severson
at *9.

he ﬁled multiple

2014. (R., p.136.)

It

“alleged that post-conviction counsel failed t0 raise certain issues related t0 expert Witness

testimony, thus Violating [Severson’s] Sixth

district court

claims.

right t0 confront witnesses.” (Id.)

The

“entered an order denying Severson’s successive petition” and dismissing his

Severson

(unpublished).

Amendment

V.

State,

N0. 42594, 2016

WL

1411631 (Idaho

Ct. App., April 11,

Severson ﬁled a motion t0 reconsider, which was also denied.

2016)

Li. at *1.

Severson appealed from the order denying his motion for reconsideration and the Idaho Court of

Appeals afﬁrmed in an unpublished opinion.

Li. at *2.

“Motion

In October 0f 2016, Severson ﬁled a

19-4908, Successive

IRC 57

successive petition.

(R.,

for

Leave

t0 File

an LC. §§ 19-4901(a)

&

Application,” which the district court construed as a second

p.136.)

It

alleged that Severson “had discovered

regarding the effects 0f certain medications 0n

women,

new

evidence

that [Severson] received ineffective

assistance 0f appellate and post—conviction counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury

and cumulative

instructions,

error.”

(Id.,

The

pp.136-37.)

district court

Intent to Dismiss Successive Application for Post-Conviction,” after

stay the proceedings.”

dismissed his petition.

(Id.,

p.137.)

The

district court

New

for

Trial.”

Leave
(Id.,

Which Severson moved

denied Severson’s motion to stay and

to File

LC.

pp.52-54.)

§ 19-4901(a)

&

motion

that is the subject

§ 19-4908, Successive

Severson supported his motion with a

of

this appeal: his

IRC 57 Application

“Memorandum 0f Law

Support 0f a Motion for Leave t0 File a Successive Post-Conviction Petition for a

and a declaration requesting leave
57.)

The

petition.

petition

district court

(E

id.,

was ﬁled

t0 ﬁle “a Successive Post-Conviction Petition.”

New

for

in

Trial”

(R., pp.55-

construed this motion as Severson’s attempt to ﬁle a third successive

pp.102-03.) However,

it is

in the underlying criminal

in the underlying criminal case, as

opposed

important t0 note that Severson’s third successive

case—CR-2002-158—and,

t0 a

new post-conviction

was new information “now

as a result,

action.

Severson’s third successive post-conviction petition alleged,

there

t0

(Id.)

In February 0f 2018, Severson ﬁled the

“Motion

issued a “Notice of

(E

among

was

id.,

litigated

p.55.)

other things, that

available concerning the effects of sleep aids such as

Ambien,

[Which] alone or in combination With other drugs can[,] and has[,] caused injuries including

death t0 female users,’

alleged that

trial

,

Which “tends

t0

prove

counsel was ineffective “due to

[his]

innocence.”

(Id.,

failure to obj ect t0

p.70.)

Severson also

testimony that the

[district

from Dr. Grobin, concerning Out-of—State

court] allowed the state to ‘Solicit’

food and drink collected from” Severson’s home.

The

district court

(Id.,

(Id.,

As

p.102.)

p.78.)

and

for Severson’s

Severson’s “grounds for seeking a

that

new

its

new

trial”

intent to dismiss the

evidence claim, the

proposed third

district court

The court held

pp.114-16.)

there

[it]

relief.

that “because [Severson] has previously raised the issue that

evidence suggesting that the substances found in Ms. Severson’s body could have caused

is

her accidental death, [Severson]

relief

noted

on the purported new evidence was

“adjudicated” 0n direct appeal and raised in Severson’s ﬁrst petition for post—conviction

(Id.,

of

issued a notice of intent t0 deny Severson’s “Motion for Leave t0 File a

third successive petition for post-conviction relief

successive petition.”

1ab[] testing

based 0n the same issue.”

is

not entitled t0 ﬁle a successive petition for post—conviction

(Id.,

granted [Severson’s] Motion and allowed

does not appear t0
as there

was

concluded

“still

The

p.1 16.)

him

entitle Petitioner t0 relief and

district court

went on

to reason that

“even

if

t0 ﬁle a Third Successive Petition, the Petition

would be

subj ect t0

summary dismissal,”

sufﬁcient evidence for a jury to convict” Severson.

(Id.,

p.117.)

insofar

The court

that:

Therefore, the Court ﬁnds that granting [Severson’s] Motion and permitting

[Severson]

t0

ﬁle

substantive merits

his

Third

Successive

Petition

for

would serve no useful purpose.

consideration

0n

its

Because the procedural

requirements stated in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code
Sections

19-4901

through

19-491

1,

bar

[Severson]

from ﬁling the Third

Successive Petition 0n the basis of the above-referenced newly discovered
evidence, the Court need not consider

its

substantive merits.

(Id.)

Similarly, regarding Severson’s claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel, the district

court concluded that the “claim

is

untimely, and duplicates claims asserted in [Severson’s]

previous Petitions for post-conviction relief.”

(Id.,

p.1 19.)

The court pointed

that “[a]11

of the

alleged deﬁcient conduct [Severson] asserts in his Third Successive Petition occurred in 2002,

and should have been known

to [Severson]

when he ﬁled

his First Petition.”

(1d,,

The

p.120.)

court foundl that Severson “did not raise these claims in a reasonable time after receiving notice

of them, and has not provided a sufﬁcient reason for failing t0 d0 so.”
therefore, that Severson’s third successive petition

was

subject to

(Id.)

The court

held,

summary dismissal:

[T]he Court ﬁnds that because the Third Successive Petition is barred on
procedural grounds, [Severson] would not be entitled to relief on the Petition’s

Accordingly, n0 purposes would be served by granting [Severson’s]
Motion and permitting him to ﬁle a petition for a decision 0n its merits. As a
result, the Court hereby expresses its intent to deny [Severson’s] Motion for leave
merits.

to ﬁle the Third Successive Petition.

(Id.,

p.121.)

Severson ﬁled a response to the court’s notice.
“third successive application”

Among

had been improperly docketed

other things, he argued that his

in the original criminal case:

For reasons unknown, Mr. Severson’s third successive application was not
assigned a

new

criminal case.

case

In Idaho,

proceedings are
challenged.

number by

civil

See State

it is

in the original underlying

a well resolved principle 0f law that post-conviction

in nature,
V.

was ﬁled

the Clerk, but

and separate from the criminal case being

Law, 131 Idaho 90, 952 P.2d 905 (1997).

proceedings are not an extension of the criminal case from Which
[are]

it

PCR

arises,

but

a separate civil action and the rules of civil procedure apply. Saykhamchone

V. State,

127 Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995[).]

Accordingly, Mr. Severson’s instant

PCR application must be

assigned a separate

case number, distinct from the original criminal proceedings held.

(Id.,

pp.129-30.)

The court held a hearing on
argued, pro se, that

1

The

still

“it is

its

notice 0f intent t0 dismiss.

very important that

district court additionally

this case

Among

other things, Severson

be documented With a

denied relief on this claim because,

new

at that time,

case

number

Severson

III

for

was

pending, and the district court “decline[d] t0 grant leave t0 ﬁle a Third Successive Petition

for relief while [Severson’s] original

2009 Petition remains pending on appeal.”

(R., p.121.)

me

t0

have an opportunity

t0 perfect

did not address this request.

The

district court

my petition.”

The

(7/16/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-4.)

district court

(E 7/16/18 Tr.)

issued an “Order Denying Leave t0 File a Third Successive Petition for

Post-ConViction Relief.”

(R., pp.134-49.)

In

it,

the district court reiterated that the “newly

discovered evidence issue” was previously litigated in prior proceedings 0r otherwise barred

from “consideration on

its

substantive merits,

99

and

that the ineffective assistance

0f counsel

claims were (as Severson by then had “acknowledge[d]”) “adjudicated in previous postconviction relief petitions.”

Leave

to File a Successive

entitled to relief on the

(Id.,

Thus, the court held that Severson’s “Motion for

pp.147-48.)

IRC Application

grounds asserted.”

Thereafter, Severson ﬁled a

for

(Id.,

“Motion

New

Trial is denied because [Severson]

civil

case

Code

57, I.C. § 19-4902.”

number

(Id.,

to Enter Final

pp.150-52.) In

to these proceedings in

Title 19-4902, et seq.”

(Id.,

Judgment Following Dismissal of

it,

it

The

p.150.)

district

Pursuant

accordance With Criminal Procedure Rule 57 and Idaho

being assigned a separate

authorities.” (Id., p.152.)

Number

Severson “ask[ed] the Court to assign a

Severson additionally “ask[ed] the Court t0 address

the issue involving the instant petition improperly being docketed

case, rather than

civil case

number

on the underlying criminal

in accord with the aforementioned

denied the motion:

The Court has reviewed the motion and ﬁnds it is without merit. This Court
denied Petitioner’s Motion t0 ﬁle a Third Successive Post—Conviction Petition on
July 20, 2018. The Order was ﬁled in the underlying criminal case. No new civil
case needs t0 be opened by the Clerk 0f Court as leave to ﬁle a third successive
petition

be ﬁled.

was not granted and no new post-conviction proceedings were allowed
It is

this Court’s belief that Petitioner

may

t0

appeal this Court’s denial of

his request for leave t0 ﬁle a third successive petition without another

being ﬁled in the criminal case.

not

p.148.)

Third Successive Petition for Post—Conviction Relief, and Assign Civil Case

T0 Crim. Pro

is

judgment

(Id.,

p.165.)

Severson timely appealed.

(Id.,

pp.153-55.)

ISSUES
Severson

Did the

states the issue

on appeal

as:

summarily dismissing Mr. Severson’s petition for
because there is an issue of material fact as t0 whether

district court err in

post-conviction relief

newly discovered evidence
ﬁnding 0f guilt?

substantially

undermines conﬁdence in

[the] jury’s

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Because the

district court

did not have any post-remittitur jurisdiction to consider post-

conviction motions ﬁled in the criminal case, should this appeal be dismissed?

II.

Alternatively, has Severson failed to
for leave?

show

the district court erred in denying his motion

ARGUMENT
I.

This Appeal Should

Be Dismissed Because The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction,
To Consider Severson’s Post—Conviction Motion

In

The

Post-Remittitur Criminal Case,

A.

Introduction

The

denied Severson’s motion for leave t0 ﬁle a third post-

district court correctly

conviction petition for the reasons set forth in

its

order.

But Severson’s appeal

fails for

a

more

fundamental reason: Severson ﬁled his post-conviction motion in the underlying criminal case
almost nine years after the judgment became ﬁnal.
jurisdiction to address Severson’s

Standard

B.

motion and

this

As

a result, the district court did not have

appeal should be dismissed.

Of Review

“Whether a court lacks

jurisdiction

is

a question 0f law that

may be

raised at any time.”

State V. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (quoting Pizzuto V. State, 127

Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995)). Jurisdictional questions are freely reviewed. Li; State
V. Barros,

The District Court’s Jurisdiction In The Underlying Criminal Case Expired After
Judgment Was Afﬁrmed On Appeal; As Such, It Lacked Jurisdiction T0 Address
Severson’s Post-Remittitur, Post-Conviction Motion

C.

“A
or

131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).

its

district court’s jurisdiction is

afﬁrmance on appeal.” State

completed upon the ‘entry of the judgment and sentence

V. Pratt,

128 Idaho 207, 21

1,

912 P.2d 94, 98 (1996) (quoting

State V. Johnson, 75 Idaho 157, 161,

269 P.2d 769, 771 (1954)). As a

0r rule provides otherwise, ‘the

court’s jurisdiction

ﬁnal, either

by

trial

result, “[u]nless a statute

expires once the judgment

becomes

expiration of the time for appeal or afﬁrmance 0f the judgment 0n appeal.” State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

355, 79 P.3d 71

A

1,

368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016) (quoting State

1, 6,

The

jurisdiction to address Severson’s

motion for

criminal case on June 22, 2005.

(32128 R., pp.1908-11.)

leave.

district court plainly

district court

remittitur issued

Consequently, the

court’s jurisdiction in the underlying

district

2009. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

motion for leave,

in February

of 2018, the

0n September

at 6,

368 P.3d

district court

at

2009.

4,

626.

lacked

entered judgment in the

The Severson

judgment on appeal and a

4,

139 Idaho 352,

714 (2003)).

review of the underlying procedural history shows the

September

V. Jakoski,

I

Court afﬁrmed the

Remittitur,

No. 32128.

criminal case expired 0n

By

the time Severson ﬁled his

had no jurisdiction

t0 address

it.

(ﬂ R.,

p.52.)

Moreover, there

is

no

motions for leave t0 ﬁle a successive post-conviction
contrary,

it

is

1,

petition.

E

I.C.R. 34; I.C.R. 35.

To

the

well established that post-conviction proceedings “are civil in nature and are

separate from criminal proceedings.”

132 Idaho

on

statute 0r rule that extends a criminal court’s jurisdiction to rule

9-10, n.1, 966 P.2d

1,

M,

139 Idaho

9-10, n.1 (1998);

at

355, 79 P.3d at 714; State V. Creech,

Saykhamchone

V. State,

900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995) (holding “[a]n application for post-conviction

127 Idaho 319, 321,

relief is in the nature

of

a civil proceeding, entirely distinct from the underlying criminal action”). Idaho’s criminal rules
likewise set forth that “petition[s] for post-conviction relief must be ﬁled as a separate civil case

and be processed under the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure except as otherwise ordered by the
trial

2

court.” I.C.R. 39(b).2

The

district court

did not order that Severson’s motion for leave would be handled contrary t0

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

(E R., pp.102-24, 134-49; ﬂ alﬂ 7/16/18 Tr.)
10

Criminal-case issues, therefore, cannot be litigated in a post-conviction proceeding. The

Idaho Supreme Court
(2015), Where

it

made

this clear in

Brown

V. State,

159 Idaho 496, 498, 363 P.3d 337, 339

held the petitioner could not “raise 0n appeal,” in the post-conviction case, “the

alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” in the criminal case—because the “action seeking

post-conviction relief

363 P.3d

a separate action from the Criminal Case.”

the

same

The Jakoski Court demonstrated

at

at

498,

cannot be litigated in the underlying criminal

logic, post-conviction issues

this

criminal case can be considered as a pleading

P.3d

Brown, 159 Idaho

at 339.

By
case.

is

when

it

declined to hold that “a motion ﬁled in a

commencing

civil litigation.”

139 Idaho

at

355, 79

714. There, Jakoski ﬁled a motion to withdraw his guilty plea “almost six years after the

judgment was entered.”
that “the district court

Li. at 353,

79 P.3d

at 712.

n0 longer had jurisdiction

The Idaho Supreme Court

t0 hear a

motion

to

ﬁrst concluded

Withdraw Jakoski’s guilty

plea,” for all the reasons outlined above. Li. at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.

Turning t0 “whether Jakoski‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea can be considered an
application for post-conviction relief,” the Idaho

In

Dionne

v.

State,

Supreme Court declined

93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969),

this

t0 take that leap:

Court held that an

application for a writ of habeas corpus could be considered as an application for
relief. “It is

immaterial whether a petition 0r application is labeled
Habeas Corpus 0r Post Conviction proceeding. Substance not form governs.” 93
Idaho at 237, 459 P.2d at 1019. Both habeas corpus and post-conviction relief,
however, are civil in nature and are separate from criminal proceedings. State v.
Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9-10, 966 P.2d 1, 9-10 n. 1 (1998). It would be too much ofa
stretch t0 hold that a motion ﬁled in a criminal case can be considered as a
pleading commencing civil litigation.
post-conviction

Li. at 355,

79 P.3d

guilty plea cannot

at

714 (emphasis added). Thus, “[b]ecause Jakoski‘s motion

be considered as an application for post-conviction

11

t0

relief,” the

Withdraw

his

Court would

“not address the issue 0f Whether any application for post—conviction relief that Jakoski

is

barred by Idaho

Code

§

19-4908.” Li.

at

966 P.2d

at 9-10, n.

M,
1;

139 Idaho

at

Severson’s criminal and post-conviction cases

355, 79 P.3d at 714;

Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho

at

CLech, 132 Idaho

321, 900 P.2d at 797.

at 9-10, n.1,

Post—conviction

pleadings cannot properly be ﬁled 0r entertained in the criminal case (and Vice versa).
regardless of

how

Severson

titled his

motion for leave,

“[i]t

would be too much of a

M,

139 Idaho

at

below.

civil

Much

less

could Severson proceed t0

criminal case, Which

was

essentially

355, 79 P.3d at 714.

litigate a separate civil action within the

And

stretch t0

hold that a motion ﬁled in a criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing
litigation.”

ﬁle

355-56, 79 P.3d at 714-15.

That exact same reasoning applies here.
are entirely separate.

may

What happened

(E R., pp.102-49.)
Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides

that

an appeal in a criminal matter must be

ﬁled Within 42 days from the date 0f the ﬁling of “any judgment or order 0f the
appealable as a matter 0f right.”

subject matter jurisdiction

is

I.A.R. 14(a).

An

order entered

by

district court

m

the district court without

void and, therefore, not appealable as a matter of

right.

Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163, 244 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2010) (abrogated on other grounds by

Verska

V. Saint

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

Because the court lacked jurisdiction
this appeal

Ctr.,

t0 rule

151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011)).

0n Severson’s motion the denial order was void and

should be dismissed.

12

II.

Alternatively, Severson’s

Even assuming
he

fails to

show

Motion For Leave Was Properly Denied For The Reasons Set Forth
The District Court’s Order

the district court

petition

The

the district court erred.

order, attached as an appendix

(R., pp.134-49.)

standards.

had jurisdiction

district court

and incorporated herein,

The court

t0 address Severson’s

element of the standard under which requests for

issued a well-reasoned, thoughtful

that applied the correct post—conviction

litigated,

new

trials are

and

failed t0 establish each

evaluated.”

court therefore correctly concluded that “a Third Successive Petition

“is

motion for leave,

correctly explained that Severson’s third successive

had “not raised any new issues not previously

Severson

In

is

(Id.,

p.147.)

The

procedurally barred” and

not entitled t0 ﬁle a third successive petition for post-conviction relief.”

pp. 147-48.) Should this Court reach these substantive issues, this Court should afﬁrm, for

(Id.,

all

the

reasons set forth in the district court’s order.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court dismiss

lacked jurisdiction t0 address Severson’s motion.

this

Court afﬁrm the

DATED this

district court’s denial

this appeal

because the

Alternatively, the state respectfully requests

of Severson’s motion for leave.

11th day of September, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

13

district court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

correct paper

that

I

have

copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF

day of September, 2019, served a true and
RESPONDENT by placing the copy in the United

this 11th

OF

States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

LARRY MARVIN SEVERSON
IDOC #76709
I.S.C.C.
P. O.

— F-l, 27

A

BOX 70010

BOISE, ID 83707

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

KDG/dd
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APPENDIX A

Filed:

07/20/2018 11:00:03

District, Elmore County
Barbara Steele, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Furst, Heather

Fourth Judicial

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Case No. CR-2002-1 58
Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE
A THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Leave to File a Successive IRC
Application

New

for

Trial,

ﬁled

by Petitioner Larry

(“Petitioner’s Motion”). Petitioner’s

Motion

Severson

on February 26, 2018

accompanied by a Memorandum of

is

Support of a Motion for Leave to File a Successive Post-Conviction Petition for a
(“Petitioner’s

The

Memorandum”) and

State ﬁled

its

On May

Law

New

in

Trial

the Declaration of Larry Severson (“Severson Declaration”).

Objection to Motion for Leave to File on April

24, 2018, the Court entered

Petition for Post—Conviction Relief and

Intent to Dismiss”). Petitioner ﬁled a

its

201 8.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss Third Successive

Deny Motion

Response

5,

for

Appointment of Counsel (“Notice of

to the Court’s Notice of Intent to

Dismiss Third

Successive Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief and Deny Motion for Appointment of Counsel
(“Petitioner’s Response”)

on June

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO
RELIEF-

18, 2018.

FILE

A THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
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The Conn heard arguments on

Petitioner’s

Motion on July

16, 2018,

and took the matter

under advisement.

BACKGROUND
In 2004, ajury found Petitioner guilty of First Degree Murder and Poisoning arising from

Mary cherson.

the death of his wife,

Petitioner

ﬁve

parole for the murder charge, and

was sentenced

imprisonment without

to life

years in prison for poisoning his wife’s food and/or

medicine. Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, both of which were upheld in a

29,

2009 Idaho Supreme Court

(“Severson

1”).

opinion. State

The Supreme Coun

issued

its

v.

May

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009)

Remittitur on September 9, 2009.

A. First Petition for Post—Conviction Relief

On

October

13, 2009, Petitioner ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief,

ﬁled on April 18, 201

1

,

re-

with counsel’s assistance‘ (“First Petition”). In separate decisions issued

on June 29, 2012, and July 27, 2012, the

district court

dismissed most of Petitioner’s claims, but

granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance

which he

by refusing

cvidentiary hearing, the district

to permit Petitioner to testify in his

coun denied

trial

own

counsel provided

defense. Following the

Petitioner’s remaining post-conviction relief claim

on January 22, 2013.

On

February 28, 2013, Petitioner appealed the

First Petition.

The Court of Appeals reversed

for further proceedings.

October

10, 2014).

Severson

At the

v.

State,

further proceedings. Severson

‘

the court’s order and

No. 40769, 2014

State’s request, the Idaho

on December 23, 2015, the Court vacated
v.

district court’s

WL

decision dismissing the

remanded the

5068656 (Idaho

Supreme Court reviewed the

the district court’s decision and

State, 159 Idaho 517,

First Petition

Ct.

App.

decision, and

remanded the case

363 P.3d 358 (2015) (“Severson

for

II”).

Case No. cv—2009-1408.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO

FILE

A THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION

RELIEF- 2

Page 185

The

district court

held an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2017, and dismissed the First

0n January 23, 2018. Petitioner ﬁled a Notice 0f Appeal from

Petition with prejudice

decision on February 9, 2018, and that appeal remains pending as Idaho

that

Supreme Court Docket

Number 45780.
B. First Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On May

9,

2014, Petitioner ﬁled a Veriﬁed Successive Petition for Post-Conviction

The

Reliefg (“First Successive Petition”).

counsel

failed

to

Petitioner’s Sixth

The

raise

certain

issues

Amendment right to

district

com

First Successive Petition alleged that post-conviction

related

to

expert witness testimony,

confront witnesses. First Successive Pet.

thus violating

at 4.

declined to permit Petitioner to ﬁle a successive petition for post—

conviction relief and dismissed Petitioner’s claims 0n July

3,

2014.

On

July 23, 2014, Petitioner

ﬁled a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Filing of Successive Post-Conviction Relief
Petition.

The

district

coun denied

Petitioner’s

Petitioner ﬁled a Notice of Appeal

September

18,

Motion

t0 Reconsider

from the coun’s decision denying reconsideration on

2014, and in an unpublished decision, the Idaho

district court’s order.

Severson

v.

Slate,

0n August 22, 2014.

No. 42594, 2016

WL

Coun 0f Appeals afﬁrmed

the

141 1631 (Idaho Ct. App. April 11,

2016).

C. Second Successive Petition for Post—Conviction Relief

On

October 16, 2016, Petitioner ﬁled a Motion for Leave to File an LC. §§ 19-4901(a)
Successive

19-4908,

IRC 57

Application3

(“Second

Successive Petition 21116ng that Petitioner had discovered

ceﬁain medications on wqmen,

3
3

Successive

new

Petition”).

&

The Second

evidence regarding the effects of

that Petitioner received ineffective assistance

of appellate and

Case No. cv-2014—526.
cv—2016-1 135.
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post—conviction counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, and cumulative
error.

Second Successive

On December

Pet. at 5.

14,

2016, the

court

district

Appointment of Counsel and Notice of

issued

an Order Denying Motion for

Intent to Dismiss Successive Application for Post-

Conviction Relief.

On

February 10, 2017, Petitioner ﬁled a Motion for Leave

he “concluded that the proper time

Proceedings because

to Stay

to ﬁle is after the original petition for relief is ﬁnalized.”

The

court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and issued an Order Dismissing the Petition on April l7,

2017.

D. Third Successive Petition for Post-Couviction Relief

On

&

February 26, 2018, Petitioner ﬁled the Motion for Leave

§ 19-4908, Successive

before

presently

Memorandum,

the

IRC 57 Application

Court.

On

the

New Trial“

for

same

the Stevenson Declaration, a

day,

an LC. § 19-4901(a)

(“Third Successive Petition”) that

Petitioner

Motion

t0 File

also

an

ﬁled

for Judicial Notice,

is

accompanying

and a Motion

for

Appointment of Conﬂict Counsel.

On May

24, 2018, the Court entered

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and

its

Notice of Intent

Deny Motion

for

to

Dismiss Third Successive

Appointment of Counsel (“Notice of

Pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-4906(b), Petitioner ﬁled a Reply to the Court’s

Intent”).

Notice of Intent to Dismiss Third Successive Petitioner for Post-ConvictiOn Relief and Deny

Motion

4

for

Appointment of Counsel

(“Petitioner’s Response”)

on June

18,

201

8.

CR-zooz-lss.
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ANALYSIS
In his Response t0 the Court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Petitioner maintains that he
entitled

to

new

a

trial

because he has discovered

community’s current understanding of the
evolved since Petitioner’s 2004

trial.

side effects

Pet’s Response

indicates that the medical testimony presented at his

the jury’s verdict is not reliable.

new arguments
.

.

.

that

Id. at 1-2.

The

new

is

evidence addressing the medical

and proper dosage of Ambien, which has
at 1. Petitioner asserts that this

trial

was not

evidence

accurate, and that as a result,

State argues that Petitioner has failed to raise any

were not considered pursuant

to his earlier appeals

and petitions

for post-

§

conVIctlon rehef'.

A. Petitioner’s Request for Reconsideration of the Court’s Denial 0f Motion for
Appointment of Counsel
1n his Response, Petitioner also asks the Court to reconsider

request for counsel, and for leave to

Petitioner

renewed

this request at the July

request for counsel from the bench and

“The

amend

district court

decision denying his

his

Motion with counsel’s

16,

2018 hearing. The Court denied

now memorializes

assistance.

v.

11.2(b)(1).

“On a motion

v.

Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,

for reconsideration, the court

must consider any

Chaimberlaz‘n, 159 Idaho 532, 537, 363 P.3d 854, 859 (2015); see also I.R.C.P.

“However, a motion

for reconsideration

need not be supported by any new evidence

or authority.” Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113. “[I]f the original order

The

Petitioner’s

admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order.”

Wickel

it

at 3-4.

has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration

276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

5

Id.

that decision in writing.

pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure [1].2(b)].” Fragnella

new

its

State did not file a written reply to Petitioner’s Response.

At the July

16,

was a matter

2018 hearing, the State indicated that
know it had been ﬁled until eleven

did not receive proper service of Petitioner’s Response, and as a result, did not

days prior to the hearing. Nonetheless, the State presented oral argument at the hearing.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST~CONVICTION
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within the

trial

court’s discretion, then so

is

the decision to grant or deny the motion for

reconsideration.” 1d.

“A
I.C. §

request for appointment of counsel in a post—conviction proceeding

19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the

may be made

available to an applicant

156 Idaho

392~93, 327 P.3d

at

appointed counsel

lies

at

who

is

UPCPA,

is

governed by

a court~appointed attorney

unable to pay the costs of representation.” Murphy,

368-69. “The decision to grant or deny a request for court-

within the discretion of the

trial

court.” 1d, at 393,

327 P.3d

at

369. “The

standard for determining whether t0 appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-

conviction proceeding
claim.”

Id.

whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid

is

“In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid claim, the

trial

court should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate

means would be willing

to retain counsel to

“Although the petitioner

is

conduct a further investigation into the claims.”

Id.

not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record

for nonfn'volous claims, counsel should

be appointed

if

the facts alleged raise the possibility of a

valid claim.” Id.

At the hearing,
expressed in

its

the Court reiterated the conclusions regarding appointment of counsel

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, panicularly noting that Petitioner has been

represented by counsel in several proceedings, including his

conviction relief petitions. Indeed, Petitioner

unresolved appeal that

is

is

trial,

currently represented

appeals, and other post-

by appointed counsel

pending before the Idaho Supreme Court. Further, while

it

in the

is

not

required, Petitioner has presented no additional evidence or argument that persuades this Court

that

its

original decision t0

deny the Motion for Appointment of Counsel was

incorrect.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
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Therefore, the Court continues to

ﬁnd

that

it

is

an appropriate exercise of its discretion

to decline

to appoint counsel to represent Petitioner in this matter.

B. Motion for Leave to File a Successive Post—Conviction Relief Petition for a

New

Trial.

new

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a

trial

because newlyvdiscovered scientiﬁc

evidence demonstrates that until recently, doctors regularly prescribed over—prescribed Ambien
to

women, which

Mem.

resulted in inaccurate medical testimony being presented to the jury. Pet.’s

10-17; Pet.’s Response at

at

A

2.

post-conviction relief application

is

a civil

underlying criminal action. McKinney, 162 Idaho

at

proceeding that

290, 396 P.3d

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply.”

1d.

at

is

distinct

from the

1172. Accordingly, “[t]he

However, “an application for

post-

conviction relief must contain more than ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that would

sufﬁce for a complain

”

under Idaho’s notice pleading rules.”

Ia'.

Rather, the petition

must

recite

veriﬁed facts within the applicant’s personal knowledge, and accompany “afﬁdavits, records or
other evidence supporting

its

why

allegations,” or else “recite

they are not attached.”

1d,

(brackets omitted); LC. § 19-4903.

“When

a court

is

record, that the applicant

satisﬁed,

is

by any further proceedings,
and

its

on the basis of the

application, the answer or motion, and the

not entitled to post—conviction relief and no purpose would be served

it

may

indicate to the parties

its

intention to dismiss the application

reasons for so doing.” LC. § 19-4906(b). After the Notice of Intent to Dismiss

applicant has 20 days to reply to the proposed dismissal.

thereof,

the court

may

1d.

is

“In light of the reply, or on default

order the application dismissed 0r grant leave to ﬁle an

application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue.”
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“Summary

dismissal of a petition for post—conviction relief

is

appropriate if the petitioner

has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as t0 each element of the claims upon

which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Severson
However, summary dismissal
fact”

by

is

II,

159 Idaho

at

523, 363 P.3d

at 364.

precluded if the petition raises “[a] genuine issue of material

alleging facts “that if true,

would

entitle [the petitioner] to relief.”

Wheeler

v.

State,

162

Idaho 357, 359, 396 P.3d 1239, 1241 (2017). Accordingly, the court “must liberally construe the
facts

and draw reasonable inferences”

unrebutted allegations as true.”

mere conclusory

applicant’s

conclusions of law.”

Adams

Id.

in the petitioner’s favor, as well as “accept the petitioner’s

However, “the court

allegations, unsupported

v.

State,

is

not required to accept either the

by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s

158 Idaho 530, 536, 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2014). “Allegations

contained in the applications are insufﬁcient for the granting of relief

when

(1) they are clearly

disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of
law.” Kelly

v.

State,

149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).

“Generally, LC. § 19-4908 requires that

conviction relief be asserted in one petition.”

369 (2014). “A11 grounds available

all

Murphy

allegations relating to a request for post-

v.

State,

156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d 365,

for relief available t0 an applicant

under [the Uniform Post-

Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code sections 19~4901 through 19—491
original, supplemental or

amended

application.”

LC.

§ 19—4908.

1]

must be

“Any ground ﬁnally

raised in his

adjudicated

or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and inteiligently waived in the proceeding that

resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure

relief

may

asserted

not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court ﬁnds a ground for relief

which

for sufﬁcient reason

was not

supplemental, or amended application.”

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO
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must be ﬁled within

a reasonable time after the petitioner has notice

of the

issue(s) raised in the

successive petition, not from the time that the petitioner has sufﬁcient evidence to support the

Charboneau

petition.”

v.

State, I62 Idaho 160, 170,

395 P.3d 379, 289 (2017).

Thus, issues previously litigated on appeal cannot be re~litigated in post—conviction relief
proceedings, including

new arguments on

the

same

issues. For

example, in Charboneau, the

petitioner ﬁled a successive petition for post—conviction relief and argued that he

evidence in the form of a
testimony.

letter allegedly

written

162-63, 395 P.3d at 381-82.

Id. at

was not the allegedly newly-discovered

by a deceased

trial

witness that recanted her

The Supreme Court noted

letter itself,

that the witness allegedly recanted her testimony.

but the argument

Id.

at 171,

it

letter

petitions for post-conviction relief, another petition raised the

same

that the relevant issue

was used

395 P.3d

observed that even though the petitioner did not have the

had new

at 390.

to support,

The Court

when he ﬁled
issue

when

i.e.,

also

his previous

it

requested relief

based on newly—discovered evidence that the same witness told another person

that she lied in

her previous testimony.

Id.

The Court found

that the petitioner could not raise the

years after his prior post-conviction relief petition “based on the
different form.” 1d. at 172,

“The request
evidence

is

156 Idaho

the

7, 12,

same

for a

as a

395 P.3d

at

new

in a post-conviction proceeding

trial

same

same statements

.

.

issue

.

in a

391.

motion for new

trial

based on newly discovered

subsequent to a jury verdict.” Johnson

319 P.3d 491, 496 (2014). Thus,

Petitioner

must

v.

State,

establish:

evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the
tn'al;
of
time
(2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that the failure
to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the
(l) that the

defendant.

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO

FILE A

THIRD SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION

RELIEF- 9

Page 142

Id.

“Whether a

fact is material is

determined by

its

relationship to the legal theories presented by

the parties.” 1d.

Petitioner contends that the

(1)

newly discovered evidence shows:

That female users of Ambien, have been prescribed an overdose 0f Ambien
Sleep Aid by their doctors since the sleep aid came available. (SEE: Exhibit
B).

Aid Ambien/Zolpidem, alone 0r in combination with other drugs can
and has contributed to a large number of female deaths
(SEE: Exhibit B).

(2) Sleep

.

(3)

Ambien

(4)

This

.

.

Sleep Aid is now the only sleep aid that the FDA has regulated
amount prescribed to female users by their doctors. (SEE: Exhibit B).

New

system

at

the

Information explains why Mary had an excess of sleep aid in her
time of death. She was prescribed an overdose by her doctor. (SEE:

Exhibit B).

Pet’s

Mem.

at 10. Petitioner

argues that these studies suggest that the sleep aids Ms. Severson

took might have caused her to become confused, leading her to inadvertently take more, thus
casting doubt “on the state’s theory that petitioner

without her knowledge.”
Exhibit

B

of alleged

side

effects

Second Successive

Petition6 includes a typed

list

of “Mary’s

nine conditions Ms. Severson allegedly suffered from, and an outline

lists

associated

Naproxen/Naprelan, which

states

at

with

the

drugs

Ambien,

Omnicef,

Cephalexin,

and

the bottom that “[a]ll could cause death alone or in

combination!!!!!” The attachment continues, “[i]nvestigation has uncovered

to the effect

pills

Id. at 11, l3.

to Petitioner’s

Health Problems” that

was feeding Mary Severson sleeping

‘NEW’

of certain medication(s) alone or in combination with other drug’s

[sic]

evidence as
with female

users.”

6

its discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(0) to take
of the contents of Exhibit B attached to Petitioner’s October 27, 2016 Motion for Leave to ﬁle the
Second Successive Petition, case number CV-2016-l I35, to add context to Petitioner’s current Motion. Notice of

1n its

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Court exercised

judicial notice

Intent at 12.
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Petitioner also attached a

May

2016

8,

M.D.7, which states that he does “not see

letter

how anybody

Severson took from the autopsy report,” but that

much zolpidem.”
letter

2016 Mot.

Oct. 27,

continues, “It

is

for

purporting to be from Daniel F. Kripke,

Leave

“[i]t certainly

to File

how many

could determine

looks like she swallowed too

Second Successive

to take

more

pills

than they intend.

do not think anyone knows much about the interaction of doxylamine and zolpidem.

but

we d0 know

the interactions of those drugs to

that people can die

combined with other drugs.”

all

Ambien and

know just what

ﬁve

articles printed

effects

I

the lethal doses would be,

is

from the Internet concerning a study

article

describing the uses, risks,

of naproxen; printouts from Drugs.com describing the

side effects of Cephalexin and Omnicef; and

what appears

to be the ﬁrst

claiming that the Food and Drug Administration ordered the makers of

recommended dosage. See

page of an

Ambien

to

article

halve the

id.

However, although

Petitioner has acquired this particular information

more

recently, he

similar arguments in previous proceedings. In Petitioner’s direct appeal, he argued that

the State did not

meet

Mary possibly died by
(emphasis

7

.

Nobody

from zolpidem overdoses, especially when zolpidem

dated February 2012; a National Library of Medicine

made

.

.

.

other sleep aids to a signiﬁcant risk of early death as compared to non-users,

warning signs, and possible side

has

.

.

Id.

In addition, Petitioner attached

linking

The

Petition, Ex. B.

believed that sometimes zolpidem overdoses are deliberate and that

sometimes zolpidem causes confusion leading a person

knows enough about

Ms.

pills

One of the

in original).

its

burden of proof “because the evidence

suffocating or overdosing.” Severson

The Coun noted

I,

it

presented only indicated that

147 Idaho

at

that the State’s “experts admitted

articles Petitioner attached references a “Dr.

713, 215 P.3d

at

433

Mary’s death could

Daniel F. Kripke, professor of psychiatry

at the

University

of California, San Diego."
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have been the result of her

own

Hydroxycut.” Id, n.20, 215 P.3d

at

accidental ingestion of the

pills,

sleep apnea, or taking

433. Speciﬁcally, “[t]he State’s medical expert, Dr. Glenn

Groben, testiﬁed that Mary’s death was the result of a drug overdose, suffocation, or
a

combination of both.”

Id.

at

713, 215 P.3d at 433.

The Court explained

that “the evidence

suppoxted both possible causes of death,” and “[b]ecause the State was not required to prove
the
speciﬁc cause of Mary’s death, the fact that

Maﬁ may

have died from one of two possible

causes did not preclude the jury from ﬁnding [Petitioner] guilty of murder.”

Id.

The Court

concluded that even without identifying a deﬁnitive cause for Mary’s death, “there was
substantial evidence linking [Petitioner] to her

Severson had a motive

t0 kill his wife,

murder” because

was preparing peeple

“[t]he evidence revealed that

for her death,

had recently

tried to

poison her, had tried to conceal the circumstances surrounding her death, and had the opportunity

and means to

kill

her.”

Id. at

714, 215 P.3d at 434.

Further, Petitioner argued in his First Petition that the evidence demonstrated that his

wife

may have

accidentally overdosed

on medication. There,

Petitioner alleged that cumulative

error occurred at trial because the State failed to properly preserve blood 0r tissue samples for

testing

by the defense. April

asserted that this evidence

Hydroxycut diet
documented case

5,

2018 Objection

to

Mot. for Leave

to File,

Ex.

A

at 5. Petitioner

was relevant because:

have been ban[n]ed from sale. This product has a well
history of causing the exact problematic symptoms argued by

pills

the State.
'H');d'roxycut is

know[n]

to cause over

250 female

deaths.

Id.

Thus, Petitioner alleged in 2009 that

system when she died were potentially

at least

lethal, either

one of the drugs found

in

Ms. Severson’s

on their own or in combination with other
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substances, and therefore could have caused accidental death. Petitioner currently argues that

there

is

now

evidence that shows that Ms. Severson

overdose. Petitioner’s assertion that he

is

may have

entitled to a

new

died from an accidental

trial

Ambien

based on newly«discovered

evidence supporting the same theory of the case takes an overly narrow view of what constitutes
a previously-litigated issue for the purposes of post-conviction
inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s

relief.

ruling in Charboneau, which

theory that has been argued in earlier proceedings
thus barred from subsequent proceedings.

is

Such an

was

interpretation

is

clear that an issue or

considered to have been litigated, and

is

Therefore, as explained in the Court’s Notice of

Intent to Dismiss, because Petitioner has previously argued that evidence suggests the substances

found in Ms. Severson’s body might have caused her accidental death, Petitioner
to

ﬁle a successive petition for post-conviction relief based on the same

is

not entitled

issue.

In addition, Petitioner argues that if he were allowed to proceed with his

new

evidence,

“a jury would be faced with competing medical opinions in determining whether there

reasonable doubt as to guilt.” Pet’s

trial,

Mem.

at 9.

However,

that

was

is

a

also the case at Petitioner’s

and was addressed on appeal. As explained above, the Supreme Court noted

that the

evidence suppoﬂed both possible causes of Mary‘s death, and the inability to deﬁnitively
eliminate one did preclude the jury from convicting Petitioner.

there

was

1d.

substantial circumstantial evidence linking Petitioner to

The Court

also found that

Mary’s death, including a

motive and opportunity, another recent poisoning attempt, and Petitioner’s efforts to prepare
people for her death and conceal the circumstances surrounding her death.

Id. at

714, 215 P.3d

at

434. Therefore, even excluding the allegedly outdated medical testimony, sufﬁcient evidence
existed for a jury to convict Petitioner, and for the
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appeal.

As

a result, the Court cannot conclude that

evidence already admitted

new

evidence that

is

at trial is likely to lead to Petitioner’s acquittal at

a

consistent with the

new trial.

Therefore, the Court ﬁnds that granting Petitioner’s Motion and permitting Petitioner to

ﬁle his Third Successive Petition for consideration on

useful purpose.

Com

Having considered

continues to

ﬁnd

Petitioner’s

its

Response

substantive merits

to its

would serve no

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the

that the procedural requirements stated in the

Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act, Idaho Code sections 19-4901 through 19-4911, bar Petitioner from ﬁling the
Third Successive Petition. Petitioner has not raised any

new

issues not previously litigated,

has failed to establish each element of the standard under which requests for
evaluated. Because a Third Successive Petition

consider

its

is

new

and

trials are

procedurally barred, the Court need not

alleged substantive merits.

In addition, the Court declines to grant leave to ﬁle a Third Successive Petition for relief

while Petitioner’s original 2009 Petition remains pending on appeal.

Supreme Cam’s decision

in

Severson

v‘

State,

On remand

from the

159 Idaho 517, 363 P.3d 358 (2015), the

district

court dismissed the on'ginal Petition on Januaxy 23, 2018, and Petitioner ﬁled a Notice of Appeal

from that decision on February

9,

2018. The State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to

represent Petitioner in that matter on February

Petitioner’s favor

on

that appeal,

any resulting

moot. The Court cannot conclude that

it

additional public resources adjudicating a

13,

2018.

relief granted

If the

Supreme Coun ﬁnds

would render successive

serves the interest of judicial

new

action

when an

economy

in

petitions

to

expend

alternative opportunity for relief

remains available.
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C. Withdrawal of Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance 0f Counsel Claims
In addition, Petitioner’s Response acknowledges that the ineffective assistance of counsel

claims raised in Petitioner’s Motion have been adjudicated in previous post-conviction relief

petitions,

and requests leave

As

indicated in

ineffective assistance

its

to

withdraw these claims. Pet’s Response

at 3.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Court agrees that Petitioner’s

of counsel claims are procedurally barred, and appreciates

Petitioner’s

request to withdraw them. See Notice 0f Intent to Dismiss at 17-21. However, as explained

above, the

Com

ﬁnds

conviction

relief.

Therefore, Petitioner’s request to

that Petitioner is not entitled to ﬁle a third successive petition for post-

amend

the application

is

denied as moot.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
Application for

New

Trial

is

Motion

Petitioner’s

Leave

for

denied because Petitioner

is

to

File

a

Successive

IRC

not entitled to relief based on the

grounds asserted.
Further, Petitioner’s renewed

Motion

Finally, Petitioner’s request to

Application for

IT IS

Dated

for

amend

Appointment of Conﬂict Counsel

his

Motion

for

Leave

is

denied.

to File a Successive

IRC

New Trial is denied as moot.

SO ORDERED.

mismay ofJuly, 2018.
NANCY A/BASKIN
District
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